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INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH TEAMS AS STATUS SYSTEMS
Interdisciplinary research teams are social organizations. They share 
many of the problems of other types of organizations, but also have features 
that are peculiar to their objectives and their interdisciplinary constitution. 
In an effort to improve the productivity and creativity of interdisciplinary 
research teams, it is a sensible strategy to look both at the general organi­
zational problems of these teams and also at those problems which are unique 
to interdisciplinary research. This report focuses on a general set of 
problems that are found in all forms of work organization. Although we will 
consider the special ways in which status systems operate in interdisciplinary 
teams, we want to emphasize that status problems are problems that interdisci­
plinary teams share with other kinds of organizations. We reserve for future 
consideration organizational problems that are specific to interdisciplinary 
teams.
The success of any work team in reaching a given objective depends upon 
coordination of the efforts of individuals. If a team is working efficiently, 
each team member is performing those tasks to which he is best suited. Each 
team member is given access to those resources he needs. Channels of communi­
cation exist which yield team members access to information or guidance needed 
to complete their tasks. Some mechanism for evaluation also exists, such that 
the output of each individual is monitored; thus if team members are not 
performing satisfactorily or if the team objectives change, members may be 
informed as to Ik w  their individual contributions need be changed to contribute 
more effectively to the group's objectives.
In most work teams, effective task performance depends upon effective 
communication. The status system of a team can promote or inhibit
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communication. We mean by the status system of a team the way in which the 
following are distributed over team members: rights to assign jobs, allocate 
resources, control communication, and evaluate the output of others. Invariably 
these functions are unequally distributed among team members. Thus, some team 
members will have the right to make job assignments while others will not; 
some team members will be more influential in determining the manner in which 
resources are to be distributed, etc. The status system can enhance or 
diminish the effectiveness of the team through its effect on intrateam 
communication, that is, on which team members talk to one another and how 
they talk to one another.
In our society, the status system of many work teams follows bureaucratic 
or authority lines. The rights to assign jobs, allocate resources, control 
communication, and evaluate the output of others, are formally assigned to 
team members by some outside individual. This is typically the case in most 
modern work organizations. Individuals on an assembly line, for example, have 
very little right to determine how they are going to work, determine what 
resources will be available to them, very little rights of communication with 
others, and almost no rights of evaluation. This lack of rights is due to 
the bureaucratic structure, or the authority structure, which is imposed on 
the assembly line worker from above. In other work teams, the social organi­
zation of the team is not dictated to the same extent by the imposition of an 
authority or bureaucratic power system as it is by the relative status which 
each team member possesses.
It is important to recognize that a formal bureaucratic system is often a 
very effective means for organizing work. In contrast to our stereotypes of 
red tape and excessive rigidity, a formal bureaucratic structure can provide
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a clear picture of duties and responsibilities in an organization. The 
military chain of command is perhaps the best example of the positive features 
of formal bureaucratic structure־ Putting aside the fact that formal bureau­
cratic organization can be inappropriate to some kinds of tasks, it should be 
emphasized that when we refer to bureaucratic organization, we have in mind 
the positive features of clear lines of authority and clear specification of 
individual functions of team members.
Most interdisciplinary research teams do not organize themselves along 
bureaucratic lines. This is especially true when scientific colleagues get 
together to formulate an interdisciplinary project. In many interdisciplinary 
teams the lines of authority are not established by someone outside the team. 
Generally, if a group of individuals agree to work together on a given problem, 
coordinating their skills, they attempt to organize themselves into a system 
which facilitates efficient teamwork. By definition, a principal investigator 
who organizes an interdisciplinary team does not have a monopoly on the skills 
necessary for the team to function; neither does any other team member 
monopolize the skills. Under these circumstances it is highly unlikely that 
a bureaucratic model of organization would be appropriate, but there is still 
the problem of developing the team into an effective social organization.
Previous research in social psychology has demonstrated that if 
individuals are brought together to work on a team problem and are not provided 
with any means of social organization, they will organize themselves, 
generally along status or prestige lines. (Bales et al, 1951; Heinicke and 
Bales, 1953; Bales, 1953; Bales and Slater, 1955) That is, the status system 
of the team will follow the status system of the world outside the team; 
individuals whom other team members perceive as having high social status 
with respect to the outside world will be yielded the rights to assign jobs,
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allocate resources, control communication, and evaluate the output of other 
team members.
In viewing scientific teams as status systems, we are attempting to 
evaluate how effectively the members of a scientific research team can 
organize themselves into a system which facilitates efficient teamwork.
The relation between social organization of a work team and product efficiency 
of that team has been documented: Teams which possess clear social organiza­
tion, that is, a very clearly defined decision-making and coordinating 
apparatus, tend to be more effective or produce a better product than teams 
which are not effectively socially organized. (Blau, 1955; Dornbusch and 
Scott, 1975) We can roughly define a socially effective organization as one 
which specifies each team member's role, the functions to be performed by 
that role, and the responsibilities of the role. For example, we would 
regard a football team as possessing an effective social organization; each 
team member's role in the overall play of the game is well understood by both 
that team member and his teammates. We view the status system of a scientific 
team as an important determinant of the effective organization of that team.
We assert that a work team in which individuals possess a consistent set of 
statuses will also possess an effective social organization.
Each of the functions which we outlined above may be viewed as a 
dimension of status for individual team members; that is, individuals will 
have differential rights of job assignment, differential rights of resource 
control, differential rights to control communications, and differential 
rights of evaluation; and it would be possible to rank team members on any 
of these dimensions with respect to the rights that they possess. If the 
same individual who possesses a high degree of the right to assign jobs also 
possesses a high degree of the right to allocate resources, we may say that
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he is "status consistent" with respect to these two dimensions. If, on the 
other hand, the person who possesses the right to assign jobs does not possess 
the right to allocate resources, we would term this individual "status incon­
sistent". Finally, if team members have no clear understanding of who 
possesses the right to assign jobs or the right to allocate resources, we term 
the team "status ambiguous" along these dimensions.
If \<re analyze the team in terms of the status or prestige possessed by 
various individuals along different dimensions, then the socially efficient or 
socially effective team would be the team which was status consistent. The 
socially inefficient or ineffective team would be the team which was either 
status inconsistent or status ambiguous. Status inconsistency or status 
ambiguity may stem from either of two sources. First, a team, or members of 
a team, may be status inconsistent or status ambiguous with respect to the 
internal dimensions of status. By internal dimensions we mean the dimensions 
defined by the coordinating functions necessary for effective operation of a 
team; that is, individuals may be inconsistent or ambiguous with respect 
to the rights to assign jobs, allocate resources, control communication, and 
evaluate the output of others. This may occur independently of the status or 
prestige that team members possess outside of the team. Secondly, discrepancy 
between internal status on any dimension and status in the outside world may 
be a source of status inconsistency or ambiguity.
As an example of internal status inconsistency and the problems it might 
cause, consider the following: In one team observed, team leadership was 
divided between a team leader who set goals for the team, decided the use of 
project resources, and evaluated job performances, and a team manager who 
oversaw day-to-day operation and coordinated report writing. Closest to the 
talents and progress of team members, the team manager had the responsibility
for assigning jobs to members. Because he did not evaluate job performances, 
however, his requests and assignments were, viewed as secondarily important: 
team members jockeyed for task assignments that would result in positive 
evaluations from the team leader. Many team members behaved toward the 
manager as the team busybody. While he most often knew when progress was 
slowing from conflict over a piece of equipment which most team members needed, 
he could not ease the conflict by assigning priorities for use of the equip­
ment. In fact, he was reluctant to assign tasks requiring that piece of 
equipment. Clearly the manager's lack of power to evaluate team members and 
to allocate resources created interactional problems for him with team members 
and contributed to team inefficiency. In short, this is a case where the team 
manager was status inconsistent because he had the right to assign tasks 
without accompanying rights to evaluate performances or allocate resources.
As another example of team inefficiency resulting from status inconsis­
tency, we found in a team that we studied an engineer whose skills were unique 
among team members but who had no rights to initiate communication with other 
team members. He was responsible for purchasing or building equipment 
necessary for the team, yet had to x^ /ait for other members to initiate requests 
for equipment or for his services. As a result, he had no means of antici­
pating future needs for his services and could not make rational decisions 
about his own work priorities. In one instance, when faced with a high- 
priority request from the team leader, the engineer, having previously 
committed himself to another team member, could only respond, "You should 
have come yesterday." In this team, a person who had high resource control 
did not have the right to communicate with other team members or to exchange 
advice tiith them. Without such communication rights he did not have access 
to the information he needed to most efficiently distribute the resources 
over team members.
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Intuitively it seeras that people should know enough to create social 
organizations, or to socially organize their work teams, so that these sorts 
of inconsistencies do not occur־ This is not always the case, particularly 
with respect to research teams. For example, the Manhattan Project, involving 
the construction of the first atomic bomb, was accomplished through the 
combined efforts of hundreds of scientists. Robert Oppenheimer was placed in 
charge of overall bomb assembly, while Edward Teller was responsible for one 
of the processes by which fissionable U-238 was separated from U-235. Oppen­
heimer and Teller theoretically held equal rights of task allocation and 
resource control in their areas of the project. In reality, however, General 
Leslie Groves held ultimate rights of resource control over the entire project, 
and Groves listened to Oppenheimer. Teller, to his chagrin, discovered that 
task allocations he had made to his scientists could not be completed because 
Oppenheimer didn't believe that Teller's separation process was potentially 
as efficient as competing alternatives, and had implied as much to Groves. 
Teller was thus placed in a position of status inconsistency with respect to 
rights of resource control and task allocation. Historians of the incident 
have interpreted it as a personality conflict between Teller and Oppenheimer. 
Analyzing the situation in status terms, however, we regard the problem as 
built into the system so that it would have occurred no matter who was 
involved.
Status inconsistency can often result in status ambiguity; that is, 
individual team members do not really know where they stand with respect to 
rights to allocate tasks to others, rights to control resources, rights to 
evaluate performance, etc. Status ambiguity, however, can result from other 
features of a team organization in addition to status inconsistency, and
therefore deserves to be looked at as a phenomenon apart from inconsistency. 
Consider, for example, a team all of whose members are competing for a scarce 
resource, where it is not clear who has the right to allocate that resource.
In one case that we know of, secretarial services were a scarce resource, 
particularly as report deadlines approached. The situation was discussed in 
a team meeting, but the team leader did not exercise his allocation rights. 
Rather, he told the team members to decide among themselves who had priority 
for secretarial services. But the team members were unable to resolve the 
issue because each regarded his own report as highest priority. The situation 
was resolved arbitrarily; the team member who got there first had secretarial 
priority. It so happened that, in terms of the project goals, more important 
reports were sacrificed to less important ones simply on the basis of which 
was ready first. That ambiguity resulted in an implicit redefinition of 
project goals, since some important reports did not get typed in time for the 
deadline. In this team, higher status members were also doing more important 
tasks, so that a clear understanding of the status system would have resulted 
in greater team efficiency with respect to the team's goals. The team leader, 
however, sacrificed clarity by being democratic, and thereby created a 
situation of status ambiguity.
Thus far we have considered problems of the internal status system.
These problems occur not only in interdisciplinary research teams but also in 
monodisciplinary teams, and generally in work organizations. They may occur 
even where there is a formal bureaucratic system. The technical specialist 
in the military is often in a status-inconsistent position. His expertise 
may not be brought to bear on a situation because he does not have the right 
to give orders.
The second source of status inconsistency or status ambiguity results 
from discrepancies between internal status and status or prestige possessed 
by individuals in the outside world. We will call status in the outside world, 
"external status". External-internal inconsistency is a problem to which 
interdisciplinary teams are particularly prone. Remember that most inter­
disciplinary teams do not organize themselves along bureaucratic lines, and 
thus team members must reach some common consensus about who possesses status 
rights. Previous research (Berger ejt al, 1972) has shown that the consensus 
reached about the internal distribution of status is generally dependent upon 
the distribution of external status among team members. Thus, we may define 
a condition of status inconsistency as existing any time the external status 
of a team member is different from the internal status accorded to him within 
the context of the work team. At first glance, we should expect that the 
distribution of external and internal statuses in most cases would be in line. 
But there are many empirical examples where external and internal statuses are 
inconsistent. There are many scientific teams where an extremely prestigious 
individual is brought on board to perform a specific function; he is not a 
permanent member of the team and is thus given a relatively low position in 
the team's permanent social organization. Or, consider the contrasting case 
where an individual with low prestige is brought onto a team because he 
possesses an extremely important skill, and is temporarily given high internal 
status. We believe that such external-internal inconsistency is a source of 
tension and discomfort for such individuals, and in turn may become a source 
of discomfort and tension for other team members. For example, the individual 
with high external prestige may not be able to work effectively on the team 
because he has no resource control; or other team members, who are much
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higher than this individual in terms of internal status, may be somewhat shy 
in consulting with an individual of great external eminence. Thus, external- 
internal inconsistencies provide a second problem in the social organization 
of work teams.
In addition to such status inconsistencies, we expect the problem of 
status ambiguity to occur frequently in interdisciplinary scientific teams.
The reasons for this are as follows: First, it is difficult in some cases for 
a group of individuals representing different disciplines to meet and to sort 
out the relative external status which each individual has brought into the 
group. For example, how does a chemist evaluate the prestige or the. external 
status of an economist or a sociologist? Or, similarly, how does an economist 
or sociologist evaluate the external prestige of a mathematician? Thus, 
because individuals represent different disciplines, they may be status 
ambiguous with respect to the external status that each team member possesses. 
If they are status ambiguous with respect to external status, then external 
status cannot possibly serve as the basis for generating internal status in 
the team context. In addition, the internal status of individuals along the 
various control dimensions may easily become inconsistent, or may be 
ambiguous in a team representing many different disciplines. For example, 
consider the question of evaluation. Who has the rights to evaluate whom?
The evaluation right assumes some competence or ability to accurately 
determine whether the work of some individual is appropriate, given the 
team problem. Yet consider an interdisciplinary work team attempting to 
predict the housing needs of this society in the year 2000. How does an 
economist go about evaluating the input of a sociologist to this problem?
If the means of evaluation of output of individual members is not clear, then 
all team members will be status ambiguous with respect to this dimension.
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We expect this sort of ambiguity to occur more frequently among members of 
interdisciplinary work teams because of the lack of common ground for 
evaluating work. Also, consider the problem of resource control. Given that 
a team has a limited amount of resources, for these resources to be effectively 
distributed, whoever possesses the rights to control and allocate resources 
must have some understanding of the real resource needs of the team members.
In an interdisciplinary team, such understanding is very unlikely. Once 
again, is the chemist likely to understand the resource needs of the political 
scientist?
In sum, we expect problems of status inconsistency and status ambiguity 
to occur fairly frequently in scientific work teams. Given that status rather 
than formally assigned authority is the basis for the social organization of 
the team, we expect that these problems, the status problems, will seriously 
affect the team's product. Therefore, if one wants to organize an efficient 
scientific work team, one must take these problems of status inconsistency 
and status ambiguity into account and somehow resolve them.
In our current study, we are looking for the incidence of these problems 
and we examine teams to find how these problems are resolved. Some examples 
follow. First, we are currently investigating how the members of interdis­
ciplinary research teams evaluate the external status which each member 
possesses. One dimension that teams could use to evaluate external status is 
simply the discipline represented by each member. If the disciplines them­
selves are differentially prestigeful, then we have every reason to assume 
that the prestige of a discipline may affect the prestige of an individual, 
and thus the external status of members of a scientific work team would be 
determined by the distribution of disciplines that they represent. For 
example, intuitively it is reasonable to assume that physical sciences, such
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as chemistry or physics, are more prestigeful than social sciences, such as 
political science, psychology or sociology. If this is the case, then we 
might expect a team composed of chemists, physicists, sociologists, political 
scientists, and psychologists, to internally organize itself along such lines, 
or in such a fashion that physical scientists would eventually acquire the 
highest internal prestige in the team. Thus, the impact of the discipline an 
individual team member represents may have a very strong effect on his 
internal status.
Another means of organizing the internal status system of a multidisci­
plinary team is in terms of the relevance or importance of given disciplines 
to the problem at hand. For example, in bioengineering teams there are often 
problems for which the knowledge possessed by an engineer is of more immediate 
importance than the knowledge possessed by an M.D. In these situations we 
might expect the engineer to acquire higher internal team status than the 
physician. The interesting problem here occurs because M.D.'s generally have 
higher external status than engineers. Hence, both the physician and the 
engineer might feel status inconsistent working together on a problem where 
the engineer had the rights of control and coordination. Despite the fact 
that the task may require the engineer to have higher team status, the 
physician will have a difficult time overcoming his perception of the engineer 
as a mere technician. We are interested in discovering how teams resolve such 
status issues, or, indeed, if they can be resolved at all, so that such an 
interdisciplinary team may be effectively organized.
We see two means of resolving status conflicts and are interested in 
finding out how frequently, if at all, either means is utilized. First, 
potential status inconsistencies or status ambiguities may be at least
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partially resolved by artificially imposing a bureaucratic authority system on 
the team in order to clear up ambiguities and eliminate internal inconsisten­
cies. The imposition of such a bureaucratic system may itself cause tensions. 
Individual scientists are professionals with professional orientations and are 
notoriously resistant to operating in bureaucratic systems. This resistance 
alone could negate the positive consequences of bureaucratic organization.
In addition, even if the team is bureaucratically organized such that team 
members are completely internally status consistent, this does not guarantee 
that there may not be external-internal inconsistencies felt by some team 
members.
A second approach which a team may utilize to solve its status problems 
involves the creation of a special team role. We call this role a "bridge 
role" and an individual who performs its functions a "bridge scientist".
The bridge scientist, rather than reorganizing the status system of the team, 
attempts to "bleed off" the tensions which are generated by the status system. 
He may take responsibility for attempting to minimize status inconsistencies, 
or at least minimize their impact on the team. He seeks out problems of 
status ambiguity and attempts to clarify the relations between team members 
who may be status ambiguous. He may even try to explain the inevitability of 
internal inconsistencies along certain dimensions in the team. In other 
words, the bridge scientist narrows the gaps created by the status problems 
of the team.
A  good example of necessity for, and function of the bridge scientist is 
illustrated by a situation in which no one performed such a role. We had a 
computer expert on a team who was assigned the responsibility of developing 
a programming language for all team computer work. In addition, he had the 
responsibility to write programs needed by individual team members. While
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the programming language held the greatest long-term value to the team, each 
team member placed most importance on the program needed for his own work. 
Because of the importance of the programming language, the computer expert felt 
that he should have control over his own allocation of time; yet he did not 
feel he had sufficient status to resist the requests of other team members. 
Although personally very angry, he engaged in typical low-status behavior.
With limited time, he tried to meet the continual urgent demands for programs 
while seeking to steal time to work on the programming language. There was 
no bridge scientist to clarify the importance of the programming language and 
to enhance the status of the computer expert, and to get team members to reduce 
their individual programming requests. As a result, anger, tension, and 
dissatisfaction over this problem continued, with the computer expert juggling 
priorities and accomplishing little.
Since we expect interdisciplinary research teams frequently to have status 
problems of the types we have outlined, we have hypothesized that teams in 
which some member (or members) performs this bridge role are less likely to 
suffer the effects of status problems, and therefore be more effective than 
teams in which the bridge role is absent. In some instances, the successful 
performance of the bridging role might simply require that one individual is 
able to induce all team members to accept the same standards of evaluation, or 
accept the same external standard for the determination of external prestige.
In most cases, however, the exercise of the bridge role may be a much more 
complicated problem, the outlines of which we have only begun to explore.
In summary, we believe that work teams which are effectively socially 
organized will be more efficient and produce a better product. Secondly, we 
believe that the social organization of interdisciplinary research teams
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generally occurs along prestige or status lines, rather than along formal 
bureaucratic lines. Third, because teams are generally socially organized 
along status lines, problems of status inconsistency and status ambiguity are 
likely to have a large impact on the quality of the work which a team produces. 
Fourth, we believe that interdisciplinary research teams are more prone to 
experience problems of status inconsistency and status ambiguity than are 
monodisciplinary research teams. Fifth, we believe that there are two means 
for resolving status problems when they occur: (1) reorganizing the status 
system of the team along bureaucratic lines, or (2) creation of a role of 
bridge scientist on the team. Our research is directed to locating status 
problems in interdisciplinary teams, and examining the ways in which teams 
cope with these problems. We are evaluating the success of different modes 
of resolving status inconsistency and status ambiguity. Finally, our goal 
is to find those modes which most enhance effectiveness, productivity, and 
creativity of interdisciplinary teams.
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